The economic progress of U.S. men has stagnated in recent decades. The labor force participation rate of men ages 25 to 54 peaked at 97 percent in the mid-1960s and has declined by roughly eight percentage points since then (according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics), while men's real median earnings have been flat since the early 1970s (Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar 2018, Figure 2 ). These population averages mask considerably larger declines in participation among less educated and non-white men (as discussed in this journal by Binder and Bound forthcoming) as well as substantial increases in wage inequality (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008) . The decline in economic opportunities for low-skilled men and the possible negative effects of this trend on their well-being is a matter of increasingly urgent concern for policy makers and the general public.
In this paper, we seek to illuminate the broader context in which prime-age men are experiencing economic stagnation. We explore changes for prime-age men over time in education, mortality, morbidity, disability program receipt, family structure, and incarceration rates. We focus on prime age men, namely those ages 25 to 54, and on the years 1980 to 2016 (or 2017 when possible), encompassing much of the period of reduced economic progress for low-skilled men. Where possible, we examine trends by education, and in some cases, draw comparisons between men and women or highlight trends by race and ethnicity or geography. In the concluding discussion, we explore the relevance of these trends in the context of men's economic stagnation. Some of the key indicators that we discuss may be affected by men's sluggish economic progress or play a role in explaining it, or both. While establishing causality for such a wide range of health and other outcomes is inherently difficult, we will discuss some of the clues provided by recent research.
Our approach is consistent with Case and Deaton's (2017) theory of "cumulative disadvantage." While their approach was motivated by a rise in "deaths of despair" from drug poisonings, suicide, and alcohol-related liver disease, particularly among lesseducated, non-Hispanic whites, they posit that worsening labor market opportunities for successive cohorts of less-educated whites affect and are affected by a cluster of factors including health, education, and marriage and family outcomes.
We build on their findings while considering additional measures of well-being among prime-aged men and also highlighting some positive developments during the latter half of our analysis period. Interestingly, these more recent changes have tended to benefit white prime-aged men much less than other men in the 25 to 54 age range.
Educational Attainment
Gains in the educational attainment of prime-age males have slowed over time. As illustrated in Table 1 , between 1980 and 2000 men ages 45 to 54 (of all races) experienced a 22 percentage point decline in the share that were high school dropouts, as well as a 15-point increase in the share with some college and a 12-point increase in the share with a college degree. This reflects the fact that men in the first half of the Baby Boom cohort (between 1963 and 1972, or roughly in the first half of the Generation X cohort) made similar educational choices as had the earlier cohorts. Recently, there has been a more modest increase in men's education, as the share of men ages 25 to 34 with a college degree grew by 5 percentage points between 2000 and 2017, indicating that birth cohorts from the Millenial generation are slightly more likely to seek higher education than were Gen Xers. <HS  25%  12%  10%  -12%  -3%  High School  39%  41%  34%  +2%  -8%  Some College  24%  28%  35%  +4%  +7%  College  12%  18%  22%  +6%  +3%  35-44  <HS  37%  12%  10%  -26%  -1%  High School  41%  42%  35%  0%  -7%  Some College  14%  30%  29%  +15%  0%  College  7%  17%  26%  +10%  +8%  45-54  <HS  60%  19%  11%  -41%  -8%  High School  25%  34%  40%  +8%  +6%  Some College  8%  28%  28%  +20%  -1%  College  7%  19%  22%  +12%  +2% Source: Current Population Survey. Changes listed may differ slightly from implied changes due to rounding.
Gains in educational attainment for men have also lagged behind gains for women in recent years. In 1980, the share of men age 25-34 with a college degree exceeded the share of women with such a degree by 7 percentage points, 28 to 21 percent. But in the mid1990s, the share of women ages 25 to 34 with a college degree surpassed that of men, and by 2017, this gender gap had grown to 7 percentage points in favor of women (34 versus 41 percent). Jacob (2002) finds that among a cohort making these decisions in the mid1990s, differences in the return to attending college and in non-cognitive skills accounted for the vast majority of the female advantage in college attendance.
There have also been differential gains in educational attainment by race. As shown in Table 1 , the share of black men ages 45 to 54 who had not completed high school fell by nearly 50 percentage points between 1980 and 2017, more than twice the decline for all men. Similarly, black men in each of the three age groups had larger increases in the share with some college or with a college degree between 1980 and 2017 than did US men as a whole. While there remains a racial gap in educational attainment, its magnitude shrank considerably over this era. 1 Trends for native-born Hispanics during this time period were similar to those for blacks (Ryan and Bauman 2016) .
Given the steady increase in the return to a college degree during our study period (Card and Lemieux 2001) , one might have expected prime-aged men to respond -as women appear to have done (Jacob 2002 ) -by attending college and community college in greater numbers. The much slower increase among men during the 1980 to 2017 period partially explains why the earnings of full-time male workers actually fell by 1 percent (in real terms) during this nearly 40-year period while this increased by 32 percent among women (Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar, 2018) . The fact that men ages 25 to 34 experienced larger gains in educational attainment in the period since 2000 than between 1980 and 2000 is consistent with more recent cohorts of men responding to increasing (or increasingly evident) returns to education, but further research is needed to establish this pathway.
Mortality
According to mortality rates, which are probably the most widely used measure of health, the health of prime-aged men steadily improved during the 1980s and 1990s. As shown on A closer examination of the changes in prime-age mortality rates by cause, as reported in Table 2 , helps to explain these patterns. From 1980 to 2000, more than half of the improvement for prime-aged men was driven by falling heart disease mortality while nearly one-fourth was the result of an impressive reduction in cancer mortality. The rest was explained primarily by large reductions in homicides and in accidents (primarily motor vehicle) deaths. The only notable increase in cause-specific mortality during this time period was for HIV / AIDS, which accounted for more deaths than homicides by 2000. These trends in mortality by cause of death also explain why young men fared substantially worse in the more recent period. Mortality rates from drug overdose and suicide as well as the increase in these rates between 2000 and 2016 are very similar across all age groups. By contrast, men ages 45 to 54 die from heart disease and cancer at rates more than ten times those of men 25 to 34. Thus, declines since 2000 in heart disease mortality (albeit smaller than those seen in earlier periods) and in cancer mortality have been sufficient to outweigh increases in drug overdose and suicide deaths for men 35 to 54, but not for men 25 to 34.
Mortality trends since 2000 have varied substantially by race and ethnicity, as highlighted by Deaton (2015, 2017) . For example, the mortality rate among black HIV/AIDS (65 versus 9 per 100,000), and thus benefitted far more from the subsequent plunge in the HIV/AIDS mortality rate.
In addition, black men saw much smaller increases in the suicide rate (7 percent versus 32 percent for white men) and were much less likely to commit suicide initially. As a result, white men are now more than twice as likely as black men to commit suicide (31 versus 13 per 100,000). Finally, the death rates from (primarily drug and alcohol-induced) accidents increased by 5 times as much among white prime-aged men as among black men of the same age. Thus even though black men have been more affected by the increase in the homicide rate since 2000, this change is dwarfed by the combination of HIV/AIDS, drug-and-alcohol-induced accidents, and suicides.
For Hispanic or Latino prime-aged males, mortality rates fell by 1.2 percent annually from 2000 to 2016, while the corresponding rate among their non-Hispanic white counterparts rose by 0.7 percent annually. 3 As a result of these changes, mortality rates among white, non-Hispanic prime-aged males are now more than 50 percent higher than among Hispanic prime-aged males (320 versus 211 per 100,000). The adverse mortality trend for white non-Hispanic men is stronger among those with low levels of education, Case and Deaton (2017) find that mortality rates have risen over the past two decades among prime-aged white non-Hispanic men without a college degree, while holding steady or declining for their counterparts with a college degree. One challenge for assessing how mortality changes have differed by educational attainment is that the fraction of men who are high school dropouts has fallen substantially over time (Table 1) . Differential changes in mortality by education in recent decades thus could be driven by changes in the composition of individuals in each education group -that is, high school dropouts becoming more adversely selected -rather than by differential changes in each group's mortality rate. To address this issue, Bound et al (2014) The following table groups all 50 states and the District of Columbia into four quartiles based on the share of non-Hispanic white men aged 25 to 54 who were without a high school degree in 2000. As Table 3 Establishing whether there is a link between the rise in mortality for low-skilled men -particularly the increase in "deaths of despair" -and economic conditions is an active area of research. Pierce and Schott (2016) find that the lowering of trade barriers with China around 2000 led to substantial increases in both suicide and opioid overdose mortality rates, with larger effects in trade-exposed counties with a higher share of less educated men, reflecting the policy's larger employment effects on this group. This is consistent with Case and Deaton (2017) , who find that increases in reports of pain (which is often treated with opioids) since the mid-1990s have occurred exclusively among the less educated. Ruhm (2018) argues that the rise in opioid use is more strongly related to drug access (the "drug environment") than to economic conditions. Krueger's (2017) surprising finding that nearly half of prime-aged men who are out of the labor force take pain medication on a daily basis does not establish the direction of causality between employment and opioid use, but does underscore the importance of future research that might do so.
Morbidity, Self-Reported Health Measures and Disability Insurance
Health measures other than mortality may capture health issues that are more prevalent among prime-age men and potentially more pertinent to labor force participation. On Health problems rise with age, as expected, although their incidence depends on the measure used. In 2000, the share of men without a high school degree who report themselves to be in fair or poor health triples from 6 percent at ages 25 to 34 to 18 percent at ages 45 to 54; the share reporting a work-limiting disability is similar. The same age pattern exists for the other health measures, but the share of men reporting ADL or IADL problems (1 to 3 percent) is much lower and the share reporting physical limitations (14 to 34 percent) or obesity (22 to 29 percent) is much higher. 6 All measures rely on self-reported data. For physical limitations, the nine physical activities include: walking a quarter mile, climbing ten steps, standing two hours, sitting two hours, stooping/bending/kneeling, reaching over one's head, grasping small objects, carrying ten pounds, and moving large objects. For ADL, the six activities include: bathing, dressing, eating, toileting, getting around the house, and getting in and out of a bed or chair. The IADL measure is based on a single question about difficulty with routine needs such as such as everyday household chores, doing necessary business, shopping, or getting around for other purposes. For all limitation variables, those reporting any degree of difficulty are coded as being limited.
There is a steep health gradient with respect to education -within each age group, the share in fair or poor health is roughly 2.5 times as large for men with a high school education or less than for men with some college or more. Men with less education are similarly more likely to report having a work-limiting disability, limitations in physical activity or ADLs/IADLs, and obesity, although the relative differences are somewhat smaller for physical limitations and obesity (about 1.3 times as large). Interestingly, for ADL/IADL difficulty, there is some indication that the education gradient is larger (on a relative basis) for young men than for older men.
Men's health, as captured by these measures, is getting worse over time. As seen on Table 4 , the fraction reporting a health problem is higher in 2015 than in 2000 in nearly every case. On a relative basis, increases are greatest for ADL and IADL difficulties, which had the lowest values initially but saw increases of about 70 percent relative to baseline.
For the other health measures, the increases are about 10 percent for work and physical limits and 30 to 40 percent for self-reported health and obesity. Using an earlier version of this data, Duggan and Imberman (2011) find a small increase in work and activity limitations among prime-aged men from 1984 to 1996, while Martin and Schoeni (2014) show that the increase in limitations is partly explained by the rise in body mass index. Although the recent changes represent sizeable increases over a relatively short period, the absolute share of the population reporting the most serious health problems, such as ADL difficulties, generally remains low. In comparing changes in mortality and morbidity, it is interesting to note that mortality improved from 1980 to 2000 but the trend reversed after 2000 for younger men and non-Hispanic less-educated whites, while morbidity has worsened continuously since 1980 and more so for the less educated.
The increases over time in reports of health problems are generally larger in absolute terms for less educated men. On a relative basis, the pattern is less uniform. Even so, the larger absolute increases for less educated men could contribute to divergences in labor force participation, although the changes in health reported here are significantly smaller than the changes in labor force participation (Binder and Bound, forthcoming) .
Receipt of disability benefits are also of interest, because it may be related to health though the medical eligibility requirement, yet also potentially subject to influence by economic factors and politically-influenced decisions about eligibility standards.
Approximately 3 million (or 4.5 percent of) prime-aged men currently receive Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, which provide cash benefits to individuals unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.
Average monthly benefits among non-elderly adult males enrolled in the SSDI and SSI programs are approximately $1,300 and $600, respectively. SSDI and SSI recipients also typically qualify for health insurance through the federal Medicare and federal-state Medicaid programs, respectively. Individuals must have worked in at least five of the ten most recent years to be potentially eligible for SSDI benefits, while no work history is required for the means-tested SSI program.
The fraction of prime-age men receiving benefits from the SSDI and SSI programs declined somewhat in the early 1980s and then rose steadily for decades (in this journal, Liebman 2015). For example, Table 5 shows that the fraction of men 45-54 receiving SSDI benefits fell from 4.1 percent to 3.4 percent in the first few years of the 1980s and then rose steadily to 5.7 percent by 2010. SSI enrollment followed a similar pattern over this period, with SSI receipt higher than SSDI receipt among those ages 25 to 34 and lower among those ages 35 to 54. One driver of these changes in enrollment is changes in the medical eligibility criteria. The criteria for both SSDI and SSI became much more stringent in the late 1970s
and early 1980s and then much more lenient beginning in 1984. Before 1984, the most common conditions with which individuals qualified for SSDI benefits were circulatory conditions (for example, heart attacks and stroke) and cancer. Then, with the 1984 changes, it became easier for individuals with relatively subjective conditions such as back pain and depression to qualify for the program and the award rates for these conditions increased substantially.
Economic factors also affect disability program enrollment. Over the past several decades, increases in wage inequality interacted with both programs' benefit formulas led to substantial increases in the share of low-skilled workers' wages that would be replaced by these programs (in this journal, Autor and Duggan 2006) . SSDI applications and awards fluctuate with the business cycle (Autor and Duggan 2003; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2018) , suggesting that more permanent declines in economic opportunities for low-skilled men are likely to encourage more men in marginal health to apply for benefits.
Following 30 years of steady expansion, SSDI enrollment started to decline in 2014, with the share of men on SSDI in all three age groups lower in 2017 than seven years earlier. This decline is to some extent surprising, given the trends in mortality described above. The steadily improving economy and the tightening of the program's medical eligibility criteria appear to be the key factors driving this reduction in program enrollment (Maestas 2018) . Related research has shown that SSDI benefit income reduces mortality among beneficiaries, suggesting that the tightening eligibility for this program may be contributing to the recent mortality increases described above (Gelber and Moore 2018) .
Enrollment in SSDI and SSI varies substantially across and within states. Perhaps not surprisingly, disability enrollment is highly correlated with the state-level mortality rates among prime-aged men mentioned above and has risen significantly more in those parts of the country hit harder by adverse economic shocks in recent decades (Autor, Dorn, and Hansen, 2016) . It is also substantially greater among those with less education. An examination of data from the March 2018 Current Population Survey reveals that primeaged men with only a high school degree or less are more than five times more likely to receive SSDI or SSI disability benefits than their counterparts with a four-year college degree (7.0 percent versus 1.3 percent). Those with some college or an Associate's degree are between these two extremes (at 3.4 percent). 7
Turning to the link between economic conditions and health, recent research suggests that employment can have a substantial positive effect on men's health. Fitzpatrick and Moore (2017) show that there is a substantial increase in male mortality rates at the age of 62, when more than one-third of men claim Social Security retirement benefits and many leave the labor force. The authors conclude that the decline in employment is a key contributor to the mortality increase and note that the relationship for women is much smaller. This suggests that employment declines among low-skilled men likely contributed to the recent increases in mortality, and potentially also to the increases in health issues and disability program enrollment that emerged even earlier.
Related research has shown that income has a significant positive effect on health, and that these effects are much larger among lower-income beneficiaries. Gelber, Moore, and Strand (2018) use features of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) formula to estimate the elasticity of mortality with respect to income among new SSDI recipients.
Their findings demonstrate that mortality rates fall substantially for lower-income individuals who receive higher SSDI benefits but that the corresponding effects for highincome individuals are much smaller. This strongly suggests that the decline in earnings among lower-skilled men has contributed to the increases in mortality highlighted above. 8
It also suggest there is a causal connection between the well-documented rise in earnings inequality in recent decades and the rising inequality in life expectancy documented by Chetty et al (2016) .
Marital and Family Status
The marital patterns of men were remarkably stable during the century leading up to 1980 (as discussed in this journal by Stevenson and Wolfers 2007) . In the decades since, however, men have been marrying later, as seen in Figure 1 . While half of 25 year-old men were married in 1980, less than 20 percent of this group was married in 2017. Figure 1 reports the share of men currently married, which is lower than the share of men ever married because it excludes currently unmarried men who were previously married.
However, separate tabulations of data from the Current Population Survey confirm that the share that has never been married has also risen over time -for example, among men ages 45 to 54, this share rose from 6 percent for men in 1980 to 16 percent in 2017.
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Table 6 examines how men's marital status has changed over time across race and education groups, focusing on the share married at ages 40 to 44. Marriage rates for whites in 1980 were much higher than for blacks, but whites experienced a somewhat larger decline over time; Hispanics had the highest marriage rates initially and also the largest drop. The differences by education are striking -marriage rates were nearly identical across all education groups in 1980, but by 2017 had dropped by roughly 20 percentage points among all groups with less than a college education, while dropping only slightly for college graduates. Men with less education are now less likely to ever get married, more likely to get divorced, and less likely to remarry than their counterparts with more education (Aughinbaugh et al. 2013 ). Many of the theories that have been put forth to explain the changes in marriage rates focus on women: for example, greater access to contraception, greater opportunities for women in the labor market, and a rise in welfare support for single mothers (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009 ). However, several hypotheses relate to men's economic status, including rising wage inequality (Loughran 2002 ) and a decline in the availability of marriageable men (Brien 1997) . The latter may be important in explaining black-white differences, since black men face a higher risk of incarceration and unemployment, among other differences. Being married may also affect men's earnings (Ahituv and Lerman 2007) , complicating efforts to estimate how men's economic status affects marriage decisions.
Trends in having children mirror those in marriage, with men today having children later and being less likely to ever have them as compared to earlier cohorts. At ages 25 to 34, the share of men living with children (including own and stepchildren) was about 50 percent in 1980 and 30 percent in 2017. While the difference over time is smaller at older ages-for example, about 10 percentage points for men in the 45-54 age bracket-men at every age are less likely to be living with children in 2017 than they were in 1980.
Young adults are also increasingly likely to be living with their parents, with nearly 20 percent of adults ages 25 to 34 doing so in 2015 (Vesta 2017) . Relative to other young adults, those living at home were more likely to be male and less likely to be employed or to have a college degree. There are substantial geographic differences in living with parents that appear related at least in part to differences in cost of living, with particularly high rates of living at home in high-cost states such as New York and Connecticut.
Some recent research suggests a link between changing economic conditions and family structure. Autor et al. (2017) show that areas with trade-induced declines in manufacturing employment experienced increases in idleness among prime-aged men and that these men were also less likely to marry or to have children. Correspondingly, these same areas experienced increases in the proportion of children living with just one parent and in the fraction of children living below the poverty line. As shown in Table 7 , the rising incarceration rate was especially high among period. Weighting each of the three age groups equally, the incarceration rate of primeaged men increased by approximately 160 percent from 0.9 percent to 2.3 percent. (1) The incarceration rate for men ages 25-54 is computed as a simple average of the rate for men ages 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54, in order to minimize the effect of changing age distribution of the population over time.
Incarceration
Following this period of rapid growth, the incarcerated population grew much more slowly starting in the late 1990s, peaked in 2008, and has declined modestly over the past decade. This changing trend was primarily driven by the decline in crime that began in the mid-1990s and continued through 2014 -for example, the nation's violent crime rate fell by almost 50 percent (from 714 to 362 violent crimes per 100,000 residents) over this period (FBI, 2015) . The resulting decline in incarceration was concentrated among younger The connection between economic factors and incarceration is not simple to discern. On the one hand, neither the rise nor the drop in incarceration rate appears to be primarily driven by economic factors. As noted, the rise in incarceration was largely due to changes in criminal justice policy and the fall to declining crime rates; Levitt (2004) does not point to economic conditions as a key factor in explaining the decline in crime, though this does not rule out the possibility of some relationship -for example, Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) find a link between unemployment and property crime. But falling incarceration rates may affect men's future economic outcomes. Kling (2006) leverages plausibly exogenous variation across judges in the stringency of their sentencing and -perhaps surprisingly -finds no substantial evidence that longer prison sentences have a negative effect on employment or earnings. More recent evidence using a similar methodology, however, suggests that there is a significant negative effect of incarceration on future employment (Dobbie et al, 2018) . Furthermore, Doleac and Hanson (2017) find that "ban the box" policies, which limit employers' ability to ask about criminal background checks in the hiring process, decrease employment for young, lowskilled black and Hispanic men, suggesting that employers may prefer not to hire exoffenders (who are disproportionately represented among these groups). As young black and Hispanic men have historically experienced higher incarceration rates, they face larger potential employment gains from the recent decline in incarceration; by contrast, effects for white men would be expected to be smaller.
Discussion
The lives of prime-aged men have changed in important ways in recent decades. A number of explanations have been put forward to explain the declining labor force participation and wages of men, trends that are much stronger among those with less education (CEA 2016). Possible causes include demand-side factors like skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu and Autor 2010) and globalization (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013) as well as supply-side factors such as rising spousal employment, greater use of the Social Security Disability Insurance program (Autor and Duggan 2003) , and rising utility of leisure due to improvements in video game technology (Aguiar et al. 2017) .
In this essay, we have focused on a number of dimensions that affect the well-being of prime-age males in a direct sense-mortality and morbidity, marriage and children, education, and incarceration rates. The labor market has not been kind to low-skilled men in the last few decades, and patterns in the outcome measures that we examine suggest that these men have suffered from a cluster of other problems as well.
We document slowing mortality gains and rising morbidity and disability program enrollment that are stronger for less-educated males and in states with lower levels of education. Declines in marriage are also concentrated among non-college educated men.
Examining differences by race, we find faster mortality gains and bigger declines in incarceration since 2000 for blacks and Hispanics, groups that have experienced more rapid educational gains. The narrowing racial gap in outcomes -for example, the fact that blacks did not experience the same increase in suicides and overdose deaths as whites -is consistent with a beneficial effect of education in a weakening economic climate, although these trends also reflect the effect of other factors (such as advancements in HIV treatment and declining crime rates) that disproportionately benefitted these groups. Importantly, a growing number of studies offer compelling evidence that rising import competition and other economic events that reduced opportunities for low-skilled men had direct adverse effects on their health and well-being.
As researchers continue to explore the causes and consequences of the trends highlighted in this paper, we call attention to perhaps the most significant change among prime-aged men in recent decades. In 1980, fully 45 percent of prime-aged men reported in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' monthly Current Population Survey that they had previously served in the military. This number steadily declined during the next 36 years and stood at just 10 percent by 2016 in this same survey. Much of the economics literature has examined the effect of military service by using plausibly exogenous variation in the likelihood of service driven by one's draft lottery number (Angrist 1990 ). This research has
